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ABSTRACT
This study examines the affect of business segment industry specialization
as a supplement to portfolio complexity on forecast error and Tobin’s
Q. After controlling for diversification and growth potential, forecast
error is negatively related to business segment industry specialization.
Diversification (high growth firms) increases (decreases) forecast error.
High growth, focused firms are associated with noncomplex portfolios and
business segment industry specialization. Within a simultaneous equation
model, forecast error does not predict the firm’s Tobin Q ratio; however,
Tobin’s Q does predict whether analysts forecast accurately.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Several studies argue that investors rely on analysts’ recommendations and that
their recommendations affect stock price movements.1 Basu and Markov (2004)
and Gu and Chen (2004) reported that analysts process information efficiently as
evidenced by a low forecasting error of earnings estimates. Other studies question
the value of analyst recommendations. For instance, Rajan and Servaes (1997)
found that analysts are generally overly optimistic2 about the growth prospects of
recent IPOs as IPOs exhibited the worst stock price performance when analysts
ascribed a high growth potential to them. In fact, they found an increase in IPO
activity when analysts were optimistic of future performance versus when analysts
were either neutral or negative concerning future performance. These findings were
consistent with studies identifying inefficiencies in the analyst information market.
Hence, the quality of information generated by financial analysts is widely debated
in the literature.
Research reported in the accounting literature indicates that an analyst
specializing in a few targeted industries more accurately forecasts earnings than
an analyst following either many industries or following diversified firms. Gilson,
Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) indicated that few prior studies accounted for
the differences in an analyst’s ability to forecast the earnings of focused versus
diversified firms. They suggested that analysts following single industry firms
have more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts when the targeted firm
emerged from a conglomerate breakup. Specifically, the study reported that an
analyst specializing in fewer industries generated lower forecast error and provided
higher quality forecasts of spin offs, equity carve outs, and targeted stock offerings
performance than competing analysts. However, selection bias may exist to the
extent that the post-conglomerate break-up leads to an increase to analyst coverage.
Gilson et al. (2001) contend that (1) investors are more interested in focused
firms that provide greater investment opportunities than in diversified corporations,
and (2) that analysts who cover diversified firms have expertise in only a portion
of the conglomerates’ operations and, therefore, provide less accurate estimates.3
Their paper, however, did not directly test an analysts’ ability to forecast diversified
corporations’ earnings relative to focused firms.
To date there is little evidence on the quality of analysts’ earnings forecast
given competing financial and structural characteristics. Gu and Wang (2005)
reported that the information complexity attributable to intangible assets lead to a
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reduction in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Duru and Reeb (2002) similarly reported
that the information complexity attributable to international diversification also
lead to a reduction in analysts’ earnings forecasts and also resulted in a more
optimistic earnings forecast.
Our study examines whether the high information complexity and low
profitable growth opportunities associated with diversification increases the
difficulty of the analysts’ job. Consistent with Gu and Wang (2005), this analysis
focuses on forecast error, since forecast error is an important determinant of the
usefulness of analysts’ research and recommendations. Specifically, we contribute
to the literature of forecast accuracy by controlling for two firm characteristics not
included in prior research: diversification and profitable growth opportunities. Our
findings indicate a significant positive association between analyst forecast error and
both the extent of industry diversification and profitable growth opportunities.
These findings suggest that the information complexity of diversified and low
growth firms increases the difficulty of accurately forecasting earnings. Our findings
are consistent with Lim’s (2001) evidence that analysts’ earnings forecast errors
are greater for firms with less predictable earnings. Analysts are evaluated on the
reliability of earnings estimates and, therefore, gravitate towards firms that are less
complex and that provide lower forecast error. As such, selection bias with respect
to firm characteristics questions the reliability of earnings estimates as a measure of
analyst performance.
After controlling for diversification and growth potential, forecast error is
negatively related to the analysts’ degree of business segment industry specialization.
For each analyst, business segment industry specialization is measured by the
number of firm business segments in the industry predominate to the analyst’s work
portfolio divided by the total number of segments for all firms that the analyst
follows. Results suggest that business segment industry specialization allows an
analyst the opportunity to develop an in-depth understanding of the firm, which
could result in greater forecast accuracy.
Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2005) and Schipper (1991) argued that
researchers, investors, and other analysts are interested in obtaining accurate
earnings forecasts as a proxy for the capital markets’ expectation of future earnings
growth, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), Ramnath (2002), Michaely and Womack
(1999), Stickel (1992, 1995), Chung and Jo (1996), Rock, Sedo, and Willenborg
(2000), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997), and Bhushan (1989). Doukas et
al. extended the “Neglected Firm’s Hypothesis” of Arbel and Streble (1983) and
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found that strong analyst coverage, measured by the number of individuals making
projections was associated with stock overvaluation and, as a result, low future
returns. Alternatively, they found that weak analyst coverage was related to stock
undervaluation and high future returns. In our analysis, the above results would
translate into a negative relationship between the number of analysts following the
firm and Tobin’s Q since profitable future growth leads to higher future return.
In contrast, we find a positive relationship and no evidence of nonlinearity in
sensitivity tests.
Although our results do not suggest that analyst coverage can be excessive, we
find support consistent with Doukas et al.’s (2005) assertion that analysts direct
their attention to and provide recommendations for high profitable growth firms,
which are more likely to generate lucrative investment banking fees. Moreover, we
find that analysts who follow few industries in their portfolio and analysts who
specialize in business segment industries tend to provide forecasts geared towards
firms with a high Tobin’s Q. Consequently, an endogenous relationship between
forecast error and Tobin’s Q may exist.
To control for endogeneity, we examined the extent to which analysts’ forecast
error influences investors’ decisions. A positive relationship between Tobin’s Q
and relative forecast error exhibited via a three stage least squares simultaneous
regression model would be consistent with analyst optimism and lead towards
investor overconfidence. Our results suggest that forecast error does not predict
year-end Tobin’s Q, indicating that analysts forecast error does not influence capital
markets’ estimation of a firm’s future profitable growth opportunities. Moreover,
we provide evidence that the beginning of the year Tobin’s Q is negatively related
to relative forecast error suggesting that low growth firms’ earnings are difficult to
estimate.
The remainder of the paper provides a review of the literature, develops the
hypotheses employed, describes the sample selection and research design, presents
the results of the analysis, concludes, and suggests direction for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
With respect to industry experience Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), Brown,
Foster, and Noreen (1985), Hope (2003), and Markov and Tamayo (2006) identified
systematic and time persistent differences in earnings forecast accuracy. They
concluded that the most accurate analysts accumulate industry expertise. In contrast,
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Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997, 2003) and Clement (1999) found that forecast
accuracy is not related to industry expertise. They reported that more experienced
analysts have smaller forecast errors than novice analysts as measured by the number
of quarter forecasts issued for a particular firm. They concluded that forecasts become
more accurate as the number of quarters an analyst follows a firm increased.
Experience was not used in our study for several reasons. Jacob, Lys, and
Neale (1999) and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) argued that “tenure” was not
an appropriate explanatory variable because time based tenure does not differentiate
between analysts who recently left the profession on their own, those who were
fired, and those individuals who were recently hired. Jacob et al. indicated that
analyst tenure is unimportant for it is not related to forecast error. Hong, Lim, and
Stein (2000) reported that analyst’s average tenure to be but four and a half years.
We focused on industry specialization as an important variable. Gilson et al.
(2001) found that specialists had lower forecast error than generalists; provided
more forecast than generalists, and tended to follow focused firms more than
conglomerates. They used a dichotomous variable and classify industry specialist
at 3, 4, and 6 firms. They measured specialization based on total number of firms
followed. However, what if all of an analyst’s effort is not directed to areas of
specialization, would a relative measure of specialization not be more appropriate?
For example, if an analyst follows 20 firms but only 6 are in the same industry,
would the total number of firms followed appropriate? In this case an analyst spends
only 6/20th or 30% of his time on investigating firms in a specified industry. Is the
analyst an industry specialist given the analyst has but 6 similar firms their work
portfolio? In contrast, what if an analyst who follows multi-segment firms has 2
companies in his/her portfolio, but follows 6 distinct industries. The generalist in
this case spends 2/6 or 33% of the time on a specific industry.
Jacob et al. (1999) found analyst industry specialization was not significant
when measured as the percentage of companies followed per industry. They argue
that proxies for industry specialization were not robust so to capture analyst
expertise. Their findings caution using the percentage of companies followed
per industry as a key determinant of analyst forecast accuracy. Clement, Rees,
and Swanson (2003) agreed that the general experience variable is subject to
survivorship bias.
We investigated applying a multi-dimension measure of specialization based
on individual analysts’ resource allocation decisions. Such a relative industry
specialization measure was designed to avoid the issues addressed in above studies.
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III. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Analyst value is measured by the amount and accuracy of information that
they disseminated to the capital markets. We refer to information dissemination
or intermediation as cognizance. Jacob et al. (1999) suggested that cognizance,
identified by new sources of information, improves as the number of analysts that
follow a particular company increases. The improvement exists as a result of an
increase of information exchanged between analysts and a subsequent decrease
to the cost of information acquisition. Thus, forecast error should decrease with
the number of analysts following a firm. In support of their findings, Lys and Soo
(1995) indicated that earnings forecast accuracy increased with analyst following.
We hypothesize the following (in alternate form):
Hypothesis 1: Forecast error is negatively related to the number of analysts
following the firm.
Gilson et al. (2001) argued that information cognizance, as measured by the
number of analysts issuing earning forecasts for a particular firm, is an important
component to forecasting and, thus, capital market valuation. Market valuation and
profitable growth potential (Tobin’s Q) may be effected by the number of analysts
because investors capitalize their forecasts as soon as they become public. Chen
and Steiner (2000), Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989), and Chung and Jo
(1996) found that Tobin’s Q was an increasing function of the number of analysts
following the firm. Therefore, we predict the following hypothesis (in alternate
form):
Hypothesis 2: Tobin’s Q is positively related to the number of analysts following
the firm.
An analyst’s portfolio’s complexity refers to its industry composition. Clement
(1999) proposed that specialization enabled an analyst to develop a depth of
understanding which provides considerable synergies for forecasting company
earnings within a particular industry. This specialization could lead to economies
of scale. The supposition is that complexity increases as the number of industries
within the analyst’s work portfolio rises because the analyst cannot devote a lot of
attention to an individual firm or industry.
Clement (1999) found that portfolio complexity, as measured by the number
of industries an analyst follows, is negatively associated with forecast accuracy,
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as measured by the relative absolute value of the error. Jacob et al. (1999) used a
similar proxy for complexity; the mean number of industries followed by analysts in
a calendar year, and found that increased complexity yielded less accurate earnings
forecasts.
We posit that analysts face diminishing returns to effort, thus, the magnitude
of forecast error will increase as the number of industries in an analyst’s work
portfolio increase. We used Clement (1999), and Jacob et al. (1999) proxy for
complexity (percentage of companies followed with the same two digit SIC code)
by computing the percentage of time an analysts allocated resources to a particular
industry as 100/mean number of business segment industries. The alternate
hypothesis is as follows:4
Hypothesis 3: Forecast error is positively related to the complexity of the
analyst’s portfolio.
The null hypothesis is also plausible. Mikhail et al. (1997) find no association
between forecast accuracy and proxies for industry classification. The absence of a
correlation may be due to their unique specification for industry expertise. The first
proxy, industry concentration, equals the number of firms for which the analyst
issues quarterly forecasts for the a two-digit SIC code divided by the number of
firms with the same SIC code within the Zachs database. The first proxy measures
the percentage of firms that analyst covers within an industry. The second measure,
industry experience equals the number of prior quarters the analyst issued a forecast
for a firm in the same two-digit SIC code as the company being followed.
We also examine whether future profitable growth, as measured by Tobin’s Q,
is positively correlated with analyst industry specialization. According to Piotroski
and Roulstone (2004), an analyst’s comparative advantage lies in interpreting
specific industry or market sector trends and improving intra-industry information
transfers. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Tobin’s Q is negatively related to portfolio complexity.
Jacob et al. (1999), Clement (1999), and Mikhail et al. (1997) stated that
the extent of an analyst’s firm specific skill and knowledge affect forecast accuracy
and, therefore, firm value. Firm specific experience is measured as the number of
years for which an analyst makes at least one forecast during the first eleven months
of the year. These studies found a decline in analysts’ absolute forecast error as an
analyst’s company-specific experience increased. Consequently, an analyst’s firm
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specific expertise should be both negatively related to forecast error and positively
related to profitable growth opportunities.
Although previously validated constructs and measurement items were used
earlier, we chose to create two new proxies for analysts’ firm specific specialization.
The two measures are proxies for the time an analyst allocated resources to the
industry segments of a firm’s business units. The first proxy, coverage, is equal to
the dollar amount of sales of the business segments followed by the analyst within
the same industries divided by the firm’s total sales. Sales coverage is expected to
be negatively correlated with forecast error and positively related to Tobin’s Q.
The second measure, firm expertise, equals the number of firm business segments
followed by analyst divided by the number of business segments for all firms
followed. The alternative hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 5: Forecast error is negatively related to analyst firm specialization as
measured by sales coverage and business segment industry coverage.
Hypothesis 6: Tobin’s Q is positively related to analyst firm specialization.
Gu and Wang (2005) argued that analysts facing economic resources
constraints have less ability to forecast the earnings of high information complexity
firms. As such, analyst earnings forecasts are less accurate for information complex
firms such as those with diversified business segments or those with few profitable
growth opportunities. It is expected that greater forecast errors occur when firms
are diversified or have low growth options. The alternate hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 7: Forecast error is positively related diversification and negatively
related to profitable growth opportunities.
Hypothesis 8: Tobin’s Q is negatively related to diversification.

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN
To assess whether either analyst or firm characteristics are related to forecast
accuracy over we reviewed firms over a six year period, 2000-2005. Firms included
for analysis were identified from several sources: (1) the COMPUSTAT line-ofbusiness and annual databases, and (2) I/B/E/S detailed annual and quarterly
database. The COMPUSTAT line-of-business database reports sales, net income,
total assets, and SIC codes for a firm as a whole as well as for each segment (fourdigit SIC code), to a maxim mum of ten industry segments, annually. We used
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the active and research files of COMPUSTAT so that our sample included firms
subsequently delisted due to mergers, bankruptcies, and other concomitant events.
The initial sample from the COMPUSTAT consisted of 39,751 firms.
The sample was further constrained to firms with forecast estimates on the
Institutional Broker’s Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Actual earnings per share values
were selected from the I/B/E/S database, for I/B/E/S adjusts reported earnings for
accounting irregularities so that both forecasts and reported earnings are stated on
the same basis. Similar to Brown (2001), we selected the most recent forecast made
by an analyst prior to the earnings announcement date. Consistent with Clement
(1999), we focused on an individual analyst instead of a team of analysts since the
analyst identification code does not provide broker or individual analyst names.
Firms were further excluded from the COMPUSTAT sample for the following
reasons: (1) a firm had extraordinary items in earnings per share or had missing
quarterly earnings on COMPUSTAT; (2) a firm had small, negative, zero earnings
per share values (e.g., earnings per share plus or minus 10 cents); (3) a firm had a
forecast horizon less than 30 days; (4) forecasts had the analyst code = 0 (an analyst
code of 0 does not correspond to a unique individual); (5) a firm had extreme
forecast revisions (the 2nd and 98th percentiles as per Park and Stice [2000]); (6)
fewer than 20 analysts followed the firm was for any given year; (7) analysts had only
one earnings forecast for the year; or (8) firms had less than three analysts issuing
an earnings forecast. One forecast, the most recent, was retained for each analyst
for each quarter and the forecast had to have been made within three months (the
time horizon) of the earnings announcement. The final sample consisted of 88,403
forecast observations made by 3,901 analysts for 3,347 different firms.
Our research examined whether relative forecast accuracy is correlated with
the dissemination of information by analysts specializing in industries related
to a target firm’s business segments. Lys and Soo, Bolliger (2004), and Brown
(2001) concluded that the accuracy associated to the most recent earnings forecast
differentiate analysts’ abilities. Lys and Soo (1995) found that an analyst’s most
recent forecast as the most accurate. Bollinger found that analysts deemed to be
generalized industry specialists were more accurate than other analysts over given
their most recent forecast. Coefficients from an ordinary least square regression
model that relate analyst and firm characteristics to earnings forecast accuracy is
estimated as follows:5
FE = α0 + β1ANALYST + β2COMP + β3SALEScov
+ β4 INDcov+ β5Q + β6HI + β7TA + β8QTR4
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where:

FE measures an individual analyst’s forecast error relative to the mean of all other
analysts’ forecast errors.
ANALYST is the logarithm of the number of analysts that follow an individual firm.
COMP equals 100 divided by the mean number of 2-digit SIC code segments that a
specific firm’s analysts follow.
SALEScov equals the dollar amount of sales for the firm’s 2-digit segments that have
analyst coverage divided by total sales for all of the firm’s business segments.
INDcov equals the number of the firms’ 2-digit business segments that are followed by
analysts divided by the firm’s total number of 2-digit business segments.
Q measures the firm’s growth potential and market value relative to book value of
assets.
HI is the sales Herfindahl Index that measures the firm’s business line (strategic)
focus.
TA is the logarithm of total assets.
QTR4 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the forecast is in the fourth quarter.

We used the metric developed by Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999) to
measure relative recent forecast error. This metric was calculated using the analyst’s
most recent forecast within each quarter. The independent variables are measured
at the beginning of the fiscal year. The relative accuracy measure, the dependent
variable, in this study is the proportional mean absolute recent forecast error
(FE). It is calculated as follows: FEijt = DFEijt / MFEijt where: DFEijt = differenced
absolute forecast error calculated as AFEijt – MAFEijt; AFEijt = absolute forecast
error of analyst i following firm j at time t; MFEjt = mean absolute forecast error
of analysts following firm j at time t. FEijt is a relative performance measure using
a 30 day minimum forecast horizon. A value less than 1 represents better than
average performance, while a value greater than 1 represents worse than average
performance. FEijt controls both firm and year effects via adjusting forecast error by
its firm year mean.
According to Brown (2001), researchers have identified several analyst
characteristics related to the accuracy of earnings forecasts. Characteristics include
company-specific knowledge, industry knowledge and the number of analysts
following a firm. Based on Lys and Soo (1995), FEijt is expected to be negatively
related to the number of analysts following a firm (ANALYST) indicating that
forecast accuracy increases with cognizance. Mikhail et al. (1997) posit that
the number of analysts following a firm is a proxy for the amount of publicly
available information. Forecast accuracy decreases as complexity rises. Clement
(1999) used the number of industries followed by analysts, whereas Jacob et al.
(1999) calculated the percentage of analysts within a brokerage house following a
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particular firm’s industry. Mikhail et al. identified the number of firms for which
analysts issue forecasts within the same 2-digit SIC code as the designated firm
divided by the total number of firms with the same 2-digit SIC code in the Zach’s
Investment Research database as the relevant characteristic to test. Gilson et al.
(2001) measured industry specialization via a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if
the analyst was a specialist who follows at least six firms in the same industry and
zero otherwise.
The above studies only allowed each firm to have one 2-digit SIC code.
Consequently, their measures did not consider diversification within an individual
firm. To our knowledge Gilson et al. (2001) as the only other paper that indirectly
focused on diversification. In an analysis of conglomerate break ups, they found
that analysts with five or more firms within the same SIC classification as the
spin off yielded a more accurate forecast for the spin-offs’ subsequent earnings. In
contrast, our study used unique proxies to measure different dimensions of analyst
firm and industry-specific specialization. We focused upon industry classification
of business segments versus the industry classification of the parent firm. Thus, we
identified the extent to which an analyst’s firm specific specialization concentrated
on the business segments’ industries for a particular company.
The precise definition of the variables follows: ANALYST = logarithm of the
number of analysts who follow a particular firm; COMP = 100 / (mean number
of 2-digit SIC codes), 100 represents total amount of resources; SALEScov = (Sales
of Segments followed by analyst) / (Total Firm Sales); INDcov = (number of firm
business segments followed by analysts) / (number business segments for all firms
followed by the analyst); TA = logarithm of beginning of the year total assets; QTR4
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the earnings forecast are made in the fourth
quarter, else 0.
Other influences not documented in the forecasting literature are controlled
for in our analysis. Firms with less diversified or focused strategies consistently
outperformed diversified conglomerates, Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), and Servaes
(1996). Following these studies, we used the Herfindahl Index (HI) as a continuous
measure of industry concentration among a firm’s business segments. The HI equals
the sum of the squared values of sales per segment (2 digit SIC code) as a fraction
of total firm sales. A one segment firm has an index that equals 1. Alternatively, if
a firm has five equal sales segments its index equals .20. The higher the index the
more focused the firm’s strategic outlook.
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Chung and Jo (1996) found that analysts tend to follow high Tobin’s Q (Q)
firms for firms with high Q ratios outperform firms with low Q ratios. Lang and
Stulz (1994) presented Q as the capital market’s ex ante performance measure of
profitable growth opportunities and of an executives’ ability to manage the firm
that does not require the use of a risk adjustment. We construct Q using the Lang
and Stulz’s algorithm: Q = logarithm of beginning of the year ratio of the market
value of the firm to the replacement value of assets.
The relationship between recent forecast error and either firm diversification
strategy proxied by HI or of profitable growth opportunities as reflected in Q was
not predicted in the literature. We anticipate a negative relationship if a focused
strategy and high growth of firms’ earnings are predicted.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that one role of analysts is to monitor
management and provide relevant information to stakeholders. Ceteris paribus,
when the potential for and economic consequences of information complexity are
great, analyst research activity is deemed to be the most necessary. Consequently,
analysts make the capital markets more informationally efficient when monitoring
poorly managed firms with low profitable growth opportunities. Thus, after
controlling for diversification, the demand for monitoring activity from the most
skilled analyst should be negatively related to Q.
Q = α0 + β1ANALYST + β2COMP + β3SALEScov
+ β4 INDcov + β5ROS + β6HI + β8TA

(2)

where:
ROS = beginning of the year return on sales.
Our analysis controls for the firm structure because Lang and Stulz (1994)
found that Q and diversification are negatively correlated. Further, they found that
firms choosing to diversify had lower performance as measured by profitability and
growth. They posited that firms have low Q ratios because they perform poorly and
were seeking profitable growth opportunities. Control variables (R&D Expenditure
Ratio and Advertising Expenditure Ratio) that have not been shown to be
significantly related to Q in prior studies are not included in our analysis, Chung
and Jo (1996) and Lang and Stulz.
Several studies report that stock prices reflect analysts’ earnings estimates,
Cragg and Malkiel (1982), Peterson and Peterson (1982), Rozeff (1983), Stanley,
Lewehlen, and Schlarbau (1981), and Moyer et al. (1989). Thus, if analyst activities

01.indd 12

2011/11/3 上午 11:26:42

ANALYST FORECAST ACCURACY AND FIRM GROWTH

13

are beneficial to the capital market, smaller forecast error should be correlated with
higher “capitalized value,” which is consistent with a larger Q. Alternatively, if
selection bias exists, then analysts who are considered “firm business segment” or
“industry” specialists would gravitate towards high Q firms.
Three-stage least squares simultaneous regression, controls for the endogenous
nature of forecast error and an analyst’s self selection bias. One way to gain a
better understanding of Q is to examine whether analyst forecast error exacerbates
or reduces the transparency problem of diversified firms which may result in an
uncertainty discount, e.g., lower Q. A negative coefficient on FE in Equation (4)
would be consistent with analyst errors adversely affecting capital market’s estimate
of firms’ profitable growth opportunities. A zero coefficient would indicate that
the capital markets’ estimates of earnings were not affected by analyst error. The
estimated models are:
FE = α0 + β1Q + β2QD75% + β3QD25% + β4 HI + β5ANALYST
+ β6COMP + β7SALEScov + β8INDcov + β9QTR4
Q = α0 + β1FE + β2TA + β3ROS + β4HI +β5ANALYST

(3)

(4)

where:
QD75% is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm has a Q value in the
75th percentile, else 0;
QD25% is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm has a Q value in the
25th percentile, else 0.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between recent forecast error
(FE), profitable growth opportunities (Q), the four analyst characteristics (Analyst
[ANALYST], Complexity [COMP], Firm Sales Coverage [SALEScov], and Firm
Industry Coverage [INDcov]), and firm characteristics (Diversification Strategy [HI],
Profitability [ROS], and Size [TA]). All of the coefficients are statistically significant
at the 0.05 level, except for the coefficients associated with Firm Sales Coverage.
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Table 1. Pearson Correlations
FE
ANALYST
COMP
SALEScov
INDcov
Q
ROS
HI
TA

FE
1.000

ANALYST
-0.023
1.000

COMP
-0.006
0.071
1.000

SALEScov
0.000
-0.004
0.000
1.000

INDcov
-0.017
-0.090
0.476
0.699
1.000

Q
-0.380
0.169
0.208
0.003
0.102
1.000

ROS
0.000
0.299
0.094
0.000
0.024
0.186
1.000

HI
-0.090
0.172
0.510
0.001
0.301
0.428
0.160
1.000

TA
-0.010
0.700
-0.562
-0.088
-0.002
-0.109
0.153
-0.188
1.000

FE measures an individual analyst’s forecast error relative to the mean of all other analysts’ forecast errors.
ANALYST is the number of analysts that follow an individual firm. COMP equals 100 divided by the mean
number of 2-digit SIC code segments that a specific firm’s analysts follow. A higher number is indicative with less
portfolio complexity as indicative by fewer industries followed. SALEScov equals the dollar amount of sales for
the firm’s 2-digit segments that have analyst coverage divided by total sales for all of the firm’s business segments.
INDcov equals the number of the firms’ 2-digit business segments that are followed by analysts divided by the
firm’s total number of 2-digit business segments. Q is the market to replacement value of assets. ROS is return on
sales (net income/net sales). HI (Diversification Strategy) is the sales Herfindahl Index that measures the firm’s
business line (strategic) focus. A Herfindahl Index equal to one indicates that the firm is only involved in one line
of business and, therefore, has a focused strategy. The firm’s strategic outlook is more diversified as the Herfindahl
Index falls toward zero. TA is total assets.

Consistent with the existing literature, portfolio complexity and analyst
following are related to forecast error. Forecast error is negatively correlated with
both analyst and complexity. Likewise, an innovation of our paper, the importance
of a specific firm’s business segment industries relative to the industries from all of
the firms’ business segments in the analysts’ portfolio (INDcov) is negative related
to forecast error. Thus, analyst characteristics are correlated with their ability to
forecast firms’ earnings.
We also find that forecast error is negatively correlated with profitable growth
opportunities, which implies that analyst forecast earnings more accurately for
highly profitable, well managed growth firms low growth firms. We are not yet
in a position to whether analyst forecast accuracy induces management to choose
positive net present value investments or simply whether high growth firms attract
a different class of analysts than low growth firms. Consistent with Lang and Stulz
(1994), Q is positively related to a focused strategy that concentrates on a few
lines of business (HI). Also, consistent with Chung and Jo (1996), the correlations
suggest that high growth firms (Q) were followed by more analysts (ANALYST)
and exhibited a greater degree of profitability (ROS), but were negatively related to
asset size (TA). The correlation between ANALYST and Q is significantly positive.
The novel findings are that Q is also positively correlated with the complexity of the
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firms (COMP) and the number of business industry segments (INDcov) in which
the firm is engaged. Analysts that specialize in certain industries tend to follow
high growth firms more so than low growth firms. The causality of the positive
correlation will be examined later within a simultaneous equation model, Chen and
Steiner (2000), Greene and Smart (1999) and Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1983).
The mean summary statistics categorized by firms’ number of business
segments are presented in Table 2. The descriptive statistics support Gilson et. al.’s
(2001) assertion that more analysts monitor and predict earnings of single segment
firms with focuses strategies (HI) than for larger more diversified firms. The average
single segment firm has twenty analysts compared to a large diversified firm with
ten segments that are followed by eight analysts.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistic (Mean) of Sample Data Categorized by the
Number of Firms’ Business Segments
1
Segments
Analyst Characteristics:
20
ANALYST
71
COMP
SALEScov
1.00
1.00
INDcov
Firm Characteristics:
1.0
HI
.54
TA (billions)
.85
TS (billions)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20
62
1.00
.92

20
48
.99
.89

18
40
.83
.87

11
40
.83
.68

10
37
.82
.67

10
30
.80
.52

8
25
.69
.47

7
19
.40
.47

8
18
.37
.43

.93
1.58
2.27

.94
2.31
3.16

.76
4.94
7.48

.71
5.26
13.85

.64
6.80
16.89

.59
8.37
18.50

.38
26.45
32.94

.17
27.99
38.19

.21
29.00
56.46

ANALYST is the number of analysts that follow an individual firm. COMP equals 100 divided by the mean
number of 2-digit SIC code segments that a specific firm’s analysts follow. A higher number is indicative with less
portfolio complexity as indicative by fewer industries followed. SALEScov equals the dollar amount of sales for
the firm’s 2-digit segments that have analyst coverage divided by total sales for all of the firm’s business segments.
INDcov equals the number of the firms’ 2-digit business segments that are followed by analysts divided by the firm’s
total number of 2-digit business segments. Q is the market to replacement value of assets. The HI that measures
the firm’s business line (strategic) focus (Diversification Strategy). A HI equal to one indicates that the firm is
only involved in one line of business and, therefore, has a focused strategy. The firm’s strategic outlook is more
diversified as the HI falls toward zero. TA is total assets. TS is total sales.

We show that analysts with less complex portfolios following fewer than two
industries (100/71 = 1.4) tend to estimate earning for focused single segment firms.
In contrast, analysts that monitor large diversified firms follow approximately six
different industries. The number of firms followed by analysts concentrating on
single segment firms reached a high of 27 in 1990. The number of firms followed
by I/B/E/S analysts over the period from 2000 to 2005 is presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Number of Firms in Analysts’ Portfolio over the Period from 2000 to 2005
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2005

High
26
27
26
26
26

Low
2
2
2
2
1

Mean
14
14
14
14
13

Median
12
12
13
12
11

STD
7
7
6
6
7

We examined whether analyst characteristics were associated with either
relative forecast error or profitable growth opportunities proxied by Q. Table 4
reports the results of examining analyst forecast error associated with the number
of analysts following the firm (ANALYST), the complexity of the analysts’ work
portfolio (COMP), and the degree of business segment industry specialization
(SALEScov and INDcov).

Table 4.
The relationship between industry-specific and firm-specific specialization, diversification
strategy, or future profitable growth opportunities and forecast accuracy in an ordinary least
squares cross sectional research design.
Equation (1): FE = α0 + β1ANALYST + β2COMP + β3SALEScov + β4 INDcov
+ β5Q + β6HI + β7TA + β8QTR4
Variable
Intercept
Analyst Characteristics:
ANALYST
COMP
SALEScov
INDcov

Predicted Sign
+
-

Coefficient
0.14***
-0.18***
-0.31
-0.01
-0.22***

p-Value
.0001
.0001
.1402
.5977
.0019

-

-0.06**
-0.02***
-0.53

.0508
.0056
.1800

+

0.29***

.0020

Firm Characteristics:
Q
HI
TA

Other Control:
QTR4

Entire Sample: Adjusted R2 = 17.1%; F = 229.2; p-Value = .0001; ***, ** Significance levels represent twotailed statistical tests for .001, .01 and .05 respectively. This table provides the summary results from estimating
Equation (1) in a cross sectional regression model. For each variable included in Equation (1), the predicted sign,
the coefficient, and the p-value. FE measures an individual analyst’s forecast error relative to the mean of all other
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analysts’ forecast errors. A negative beta coefficient on the independent variables indicates greater relative accuracy,
whereas a positive coefficient is consistent with relative inaccuracy. All of the independent variables are measured
at the beginning of the year. ANALYST is the logarithm of the number of analysts that follow an individual firm.
COMP equals 100 divided by the mean number of 2-digit SIC code segments that a specific firm’s analysts follow.
A higher number is indicative with less portfolio complexity as indicative by fewer industries followed. SALEScov
equals the dollar amount of sales for the firm’s 2-digit segments that have analyst coverage divided by total sales
for all of the firm’s business segments. INDcov equals the number of the firms’ 2-digit business segments that are
followed by analysts divided by the firm’s total number of 2-digit business segments. Q measures the firm’s growth
potential and market value relative to book value of assets. HI is the sales Herfindahl Index that measures the firm’s
business line (strategic) focus. A Herfindahl Index equal to one indicates that the firm is only involved in one line
of business and, therefore, has a focused strategy. The firm’s strategic outlook is more diversified as the Herfindahl
Index falls toward zero. TA is the logarithm of total assets. QTR 4 is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
forecast is in the fourth quarter.

The analysis in Tables 4 through 6 examined whether the number of analyst
following the firm improves the quality of information, e.g., cognizance, as
predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of
-0.18 (p = .00) on ANALYST indicates that analysts forecasts are more accurate
(FE) when a larger number of individuals are monitoring the firm’s earnings. The
negative relationship between FE and ANALYST supports findings by Jacob et al.
(1999) and Lys and Soo (1995).
Consistent with Chen and Steiner (2000), Moyer et al. (1989), and Chung
and Jo (1996), Table 5 shows a significant positive relationship between the number
of analysts (ANALYST ) and Q as evidenced by the 0.10 (p =.04) coefficient on
ANALYST, supporting Hypothesis 2. Moyer, Chatfield, and Sisneros (1989)
provide a plausible explanation for the positive relationship. The demand for analyst
monitoring should be greater for high growth firms because the asset bases of these
firms changes quickly. They suggest that more analysts are needed in order to keep
investors apprised of earnings prospects and risks when firms have high growth
rates. The authors acknowledge, however, that analyst coverage may be needed at
low growth firms due to greater uncertainty regarding the company’s future.
Table 6 presents the results from a three-stage least square simultaneous model
that jointly estimates the relative forecast error and Tobin’s Q within a system. The
empirical specification allows us to interpret the causal relationship between the two
dependent variables. In Equation (3), we find that relative forecast error continues
to be negatively related to the number of analysts following the firm (ANALYST),
but the coefficient of -0.02 (p = .06) is only marginally significant. In Equation
(4), Tobin’s Q (Q) is significantly related to the number of analysts (ANALYST) as
evidenced by the coefficient of 0.45 (p = .03).
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Table 5.

The relationship between industry-specific and firm-specific specialization and firm growth
potential (market value) in an ordinary least squares cross sectional research design.
Equation (2): Q = α0 + β1ANALYST + β2COMP + β3SALEScov + β4INDcov + β5ROS
+ β6HI + β8TA
Variable
Intercept
Analyst Characteristics:

Predicted Sign
+

ANALYST
COMP
SALEScov
INDcov

+
?
?
?

ROS
HI
TA

+
+
-

Firm Characteristics:

Coefficient
0.96***
-0.10**
-0.20
-0.00
-0.54**

0.86**
1.80***
-0.22**

p-Value
.0110
.0397
.0706
.9155
.0120

.0411
.0001
.0217

Entire Sample: Adjusted R2 = 29.8%; F = 225.3; p-Value = .0001; ***, **, * Significance levels represent twotailed statistical tests for .001, .01 and .05 respectively. This table provides the summary results from estimating
Equation (1) in a cross sectional regression model. For each variable included in Equation (1), the predicted
sign, the coefficient, and the p-value. Q is the logarithm of the market to replacement value of assets. All of the
independent variables are measured at the beginning of the year. ANALYST is the logarithm of the number of
analysts that follow an individual firm. COMP equals 100 divided by the mean number of 2-digit SIC code
segments that a specific firm’s analysts follow. A higher number is indicative with less portfolio complexity as
indicative by fewer industries followed. SALEScov equals the dollar amount of sales for the firm’s 2-digit segments
that have analyst coverage divided by total sales for all of the firm’s business segments. INDcov equals the number
of the firms’ 2-digit business segments that are followed by analysts divided by the firm’s total number of 2-digit
business segments. ROS is return on sales (net income/net sales). HI is the sales Herfindahl Index that measures
the firm’s business line (strategic) focus. A Herfindahl Index equal to one indicates that the firm is only involved
in one line of business and, therefore, has a focused strategy. The firm’s strategic outlook is more diversified as the
Herfindahl Index falls toward zero. TA is the logarithm of total assets.

Tables 4 through 6 estimate whether analyst characteristics are related to
relative forecast accuracy. Three independent variables are used to proxy for the
analysts’ degree of overall industry specialization (COMP) and firm business
segment industry specialization (SALEScov and IND cov). Complexity, overall
industry specialization, is the degree of coverage allocated to individual industries
within their work portfolio. This measure was an adaptation of Clement (1999) and
Jacob et al. (1999) measures. In the ordinary least squares analysis the relationship
between forecast error (FE) and firm complexity (COMP) is not significant.
The coefficient of -0.31 has a p-value of 0.14. This finding is inconsistent with
Hypothesis 3 and in contrast to both Clement and Jacob et al. that complexity
is associated with less accurate forecasting. The insignificance of COMP in our
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analysis is driven by the inclusion of INDcov, which measures business segment
industry specialization. From Table 4’s ordinary least squares regression model, the
coefficient for INDcov is -0.22 (p = .00) as predicted in Hypothesis 5.

Table 6. Contemporaneous Relationship between Analyst Forecast Error and
Tobin’s Q
Variable
FE
Q

Mean
0.03
1.04

Deviation
0.15
0.42

Median
-0.01
0.95

25%
-0.02
0.23

75%
0.07
1.88

Equation (3): FE = α0 + β1Q + β2QD75% + β3QD25% + β4HI + β5ANALYST + β6COMP
+ β7SALEScov + β8INDcov + β9QTR4
Variable
Intercept
Q
QD75%
QD25%
HI
ANALYST
COMP
SALEScov
INDcov
QTR4

Coefficient
+0.12***
-0.37**
-0.00
+0.02**
-0.08
-0.02*
-0.06**
+0.00
-0.30**
+0.19**

p-Value
0.00
0.05
0.09
0.05
0.70
0.06
0.05
0.40
0.04
0.05

Equation (4): Q = α0 + β1FE + β2TA + β3ROS + β4HI + β5ANALYST
Variable
Intercept
FE
TA
ROS
HI
ANALYST

Coefficient
+0.01***
-0.09
-0.40**
+0.83
+1.10**
+0.45**

p-Value
0.05
0.62
0.03
0.97
0.01
0.03

Three stage least squares (3SLS) regression to estimate the above structural model. The System Weighted R2
is 0.31. ***, **, * Significance levels represent two-tailed statistical tests for .001, .05 and .1 respectively. This
table provides the summary results from estimating Equation (1) in a cross sectional regression model. For each
variable included in Equation (1), the predicted sign, the coefficient, and the p-value. FE measures an individual
analyst’s forecast error relative to the mean of all other analysts’ forecast errors. Q is the logarithm of market to
replacement value of assets. All of the independent variables are measured at the beginning of the year. ANALYST
is the logarithm of the number of analysts that follow an individual firm. COMP equals 100 divided by the mean
number of 2-digit SIC code segments that a specific firm’s analysts follow. A higher number is indicative with less
portfolio complexity as indicative by fewer industries followed. SALEScov equals the dollar amount of sales for
the firm’s 2-digit segments that have analyst coverage divided by total sales for all of the firm’s business segments.
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INDcov equals the number of the firms’ 2-digit business segments that are followed by analysts divided by the
firm’s total number of 2-digit business segments. ROS is return on sales (net income/net sales). HI (Diversification
Strategy) is the Herfindahl Index that measures the firm’s business line (strategic) focus. A Herfindahl Index equal to
one indicates that the firm is only involved in one line of business and, therefore, has a focused strategy. The firm’s
strategic outlook is more diversified as the Herfindahl Index falls toward zero. TA is the logarithm of total assets.

Likewise, in Table 5, COMP is only marginally related to Q as evidenced by
the coefficient of 0.20 (p = .07) and INDcov is positively related to Q (coefficient
.54, p = .01). The marginal significance in COMP is inconsistent with Hypothesis
4, whereas the significant coefficient for INDcov supports Hypothesis 6. Once again,
a firm’s business segment industry specialization appears to be a more important
than industry specialization to an ordinary least squares regression model. Neither
industry specialization variables are included in other studies estimating Q.
In the simultaneous equation model in Table 6 the results indicate that
controlling for endogeneity (self selection bias by analysts with regard to firm
characteristics) changes the results. From Equation (3), both the COMP (coefficient
= -.06, p-value = .05) and INDcov (coefficient = -.30, p-value = .04) are significantly
related to relative forecast error. Hence, the greater the overall and business segment
industry specialization of the analyst the greater the ability to accurately forecast
firm earnings compared to analysts described as generalists. The simultaneous
model provides results consistent with Hypotheses 4 and 6 and supports Clement
(1999) and Jacob et al. (1999) prior findings.
Hypothesis 7 predicts that it is difficult for analysts to forecast earnings
for firms whose assets have high information complexity. We use the firm’s
diversification strategy and its future profitable growth opportunities as proxies for
information complexity. To test whether diversification and growth potential affect
analysts’ ability to forecast earnings, we included them as independent variables in
Tables 4 through 6.
As predicted in Hypothesis 7, the ordinary least squares regression model
from Table 4 reports a negative relationship between FE and the firm’s HI. The
coefficient of -.02 is significant at .0056. The negative relationship indicates that
analysts’ forecasts are more accurate for focused, single segment firms than for large
diversified corporations. The above result indirectly supports Gilson et al. (2001)
finding that analysts with general industry specialization are more accurate than
generalists in a more general setting and not limited to conglomerate breakups.
Thus, corporate focus can facilitate improved capital market intermediation by
financial analysts with industry expertise for focused, single segment firms.
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Table 6, however, shows that the negative relationship between the firm’s
diversification strategy and forecast error to be marginally significant as evidenced
by the coefficient of -.08 (p = .07) when selection bias is controlled for empirically.
This finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 7. This suggests that an analyst’s overall
and business segment industry specialization are more important determinants of
forecast accuracy than a firm’s diversification strategy. Using two-digit SIC codes,
Duru and Reeb (2002) also found industry diversification to be insignificantly
related to forecast error.
In Table 5, the relationship between the firm’s diversification strategy
and Tobin’s Q was significantly positive with a coefficient of 1.80 (p = .0001).
Consistent with Hypothesis 8, single segment firms have higher profitable growth
expectations as defined by the capital markets than do large corporations with
multiple segments. The positive relationship supports Lang and Stulz’s (1994)
conclusion. After controlling for endogeneity, diversification strategy continues to
be positively related to Tobin’s Q. The coefficient of 1.10 was significant at the .01
level.
To our knowledge, no other study analyzes the relationship between Tobin’s
Q and forecast error. Chung and Jo’s (1996) examination of the relationship
between firm quality, e.g., Tobin’s Q, and the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts
within a simultaneous equation model was the only closely related study. They
found evidence that security analysts had a strong incentive to follow the stocks
of high quality companies and that their estimates were reflected in capital market
valuation (the dispersion of analysts’ forecast estimates for the month of July was
negatively related to Tobin’s Q). Their results were consistent with the notion that
the capital markets discounts a firms’ profitable growth estimates via an analyst
dispersion uncertainty premium. Thus, analyst uncertainty affects capital valuation
of firms’ market values.
Since we are interested in the relationships associated to analyst forecast
accuracy, we include forecast error in our model instead of the dispersion (small
forecast error is consistent with greater accuracy whereas small dispersion is
associated with less analyst agreement perhaps due to less complexity). Lang and
Lundholm (1996) suggested that forecast dispersion proxies for both uncertainty
and a lack of consensus among analysts about the firm’s future. They found forecast
error to be positively related to dispersion in a linear model. Barron and Stuerke
(1998) also found a positive relationship between the two variables. Yet, Brown
(1998) stated that the use of analyst dispersion to proxy for ex ante uncertainty
is controversial and that the relationship should be analyzed within a nonlinear
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model. Barry and Jennings (1992) found that divergence does not generally serve as
an adequate proxy for uncertainty. In our analysis forecast error, ceteris paribus, is
expected to be negatively related to Tobin’s Q.
In Table 4, the relationship between capital market’s expectation of firms’
profitable growth potential (Q) and forecast error is significantly and negatively
related. The coefficient of Q was -.06 has a p-value of .05. This finding supports
Hypothesis 7, profitable growth opportunities coincide with analyst forecast accuracy.
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 6 analyze the relationship between analyst
forecast error and Tobin’s Q more thoroughly than in Table 4. Using dichotomous
variables that identify the firms in the seventy fifth and twenty fifth percentiles with
respect to Tobin’s Q, we reexamine the above relationship within a simultaneous
equation model. Equation (3) estimates a model that predicts relative forecast error
using Tobin’s Q and the two dichotomous variables. Tobin’s Q continues to be
negatively related to forecast error (coefficient = -.37, p = .05). The coefficient for
the seventy fifth percentile variable were statistically and economically insignificant.
The twenty fifth percentile, however, had a coefficient of .02 significant at the
.05 level. Hence, firms with the lowest growth expectations had more inaccurate
earnings forecasts than firms with a higher Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q could be a partial
explanation for variation in analysts forecast.
Equation (4) simultaneously estimates a model that predicts Tobin’s Q using
forecast error as a determinant. We note that the coefficient of -.09 for forecast
error was not significant (p = .62) and indicates that analysts’ forecast error does
not influence capital market’s valuation and growth estimates. The finding that
Tobin’s Q explains forecast error when forecast error has no impact on capital
market estimates suggests that it is easier for analysts to obtain reliable information
from high growth (high quality) firms regarding their future earnings than for low
growth companies.
The extant literature shows that size and a fourth quarter dichotomous
variable are statistically related to forecast error. In Table 4, after controlling for
analyst and firm characteristics, the coefficient of -.53 (p = .18) indicates that size
is not significantly related to forecast error. Consistent with Mikhail et al. (1997),
a binary variable, QTR4 (equal to 1 if the earnings estimate and earning per share
are in the fourth quarter) is positively related to forecast error. The coefficient of
.29 in Table 4 is significant at p = .002. Likewise, the coefficient of .19 in Table 6
is significant at the .05 level. The positive coefficient is consistent with forecasting
being more difficult in the fourth quarter than for the rest of the year.
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Studies also find that size and profitability are related to Tobin’s Q. Consistent
with Chen and Steiner (2000), Chung and Jo (1996), and Lang and Stulz (1994),
size (TA) is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. In Table 5, the coefficient of -.22 at p =
.02. In Equation (4), size continues to negatively related to Tobin’s Q with a larger
negative coefficient of -.40 (p = .03). Profitability as measured by return on sales is
positively related to Tobin’s Q. The coefficient of .86 is significant at the .01 level.
Similarly, Chen and Steiner find Tobin’s Q is positively related to return on assets.
Chung and Jo report a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and return on capital.
The results in Tables 4 through 6 are robust to different specifications that are
not reported in the text. Dichotomous variables for business segments as alternative
to the Herfindahl Index are insignificant and most likely too course of a measure
to capture the effects of diversification. The low R2 explanatory power of the model
also indicates that the HI is a better proxy for diversification strategy (focus) than
fixed effect measures. Also, the results are robust with respect to time. Year fixed
effect variables are statistically insignificant.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We evaluated the effects of analyst specialization, business segment
diversification, and expected profitable growth opportunities on analyst forecast
accuracy. Based upon reported research findings we concluded that: forecast
accuracy is driven by the type of firm that the analyst follows; firm performance
or expected profitable growth opportunities are not driven by forecast accuracy;
analysts identified as “firm” or “industry” specialists follow high Tobin’s Q firms;
research efforts need to control for the endogenous nature of analyst forecast error
and analyst’s self selection bias via an appropriate statistical methodology; that
Tobin’s Q is positively related to the number of analysts following the firm.
Our study supports prior research in that we find forecast accuracy to be
greater for analysts specializing in a firms’ business segment industries. These
results were consistent with different types of analysts with varying characteristics
playing more or less of a pivotal role. Few studies, however, analyze whether
financial markets are influenced by analysts’ forecasts. Existing research on forecast
error focuses on the wide variation in analyst characteristics instead of firm
characteristics. To our knowledge, no study relates either the accuracy of forecast
estimates or analysts individual characteristics to financial performance (Tobin’s
Q) or structure of the firm (diversification) when determining the importance of
analyst monitoring.
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Brennan (1995) noted that security analysis is a costly activity with the
benefits to capital markets remaining largely unexplored. Our study is the first
to examine whether the degree of firm/industry specialization by analysts is
related to profitable growth opportunities. Berger and Ofek (1995) found that
an overinvestment in segments from diversified firms in industries with limited
investment opportunities as measured by a low Tobin’s Q ratio. Therefore, they
conclude that diversified firms with low Tobin’s Q are poorly managed relative to
focused firms with high Tobin’s Q.
Based on the above discussion we analyzed whether coverage by the most
accurate analysts induce executives to manage their corporations more effectively
by investing their resources in high growth, profitable industries (as measured by
the firm’s Tobin’s Q). We found no evidence of analysts affecting management
investment decisions. In a three-stage least squares simultaneous regression model,
forecast error did not predict the value of end of year Tobin’s Q. Hence, it appears
that equity capital markets do not rely on the accuracy of analyst forecasts when
estimating firms’ profitable growth opportunities. Industry specialists, however,
tend to follow firms with a high Tobin’s Q, whereas generalists follow firms with a
low Tobin’s Q resulting in a higher forecast error.
We also ask whether both a firm’s profitable growth opportunities and its
extent of diversification are related to analysts’ forecast accuracy. In other words,
do analysts predict more accurately when firms’ earnings are predictable? We
consistently find that analysts with the highest accuracy follow well-managed
focused firms with a high Tobin’s Q. In contrast, the least accurate analysts have
poorly managed, low Tobin’s Q, or diversified firms in their portfolio.
Zach Wagner, senior pharmaceutical analyst at Edward Jones, provides
a rational for our results. He states that well managed firms with few business
segment industries are more transparent in the sense that they are willing to provide
a guidance to analysts and, most likely, the capital markets prior to the forecast. On
the other hand, executives at large diversified corporations and those at firms with
low profitable growth opportunities are reluctant to be as forthcoming about the
future earnings projection. Consequently, Mr. Wagner states that analysts following
low growth or diversified firms are known to be less accurate when estimating
earnings than when they monitor single segment and high growth firms. Instead
of utilizing forecast error as criteria for judging performance, he states that his firm
rewards analysts on their ability to project firms’ cash flows and stock prices instead
of earnings.
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Academics studies provide support for Mr. Wagner’s viewpoint. Literature
reports that the quality of analyst earnings forecasts is positively affected by the
quality of information disclosed by the firm’s management. Byard and Shaw (2003)
found that analyst forecasts are more precise when firms provide high quality
financial disclosure as indicated by the AIMR ranking.
Our conclusion that high Tobin’s Q firms are easier to forecast than other
firms is supported by the extant literature. The literature reports that focused
firms have high Tobin Q ratios and that high Tobin’s Q firms have both higher
profitability and a more stable cash flow than diversified corporations. Chen and
Steiner (2000), Moyer et al. (1989), and Chung and Jo (1996) found that the
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts was low and that profitability, as measured by return
to capital, was positive for high Tobin’s Q firms.
Future research should revisit the significance of analysts’ forecasting to
the capital markets by examining the importance of information complexity as
measured by research and development. Gu and Wang (2005) found analysts
forecast to be less accurately when firm were less transparent.

NOTES
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1

Greene and Smart (1999) find that traders rely on recommendations of analysts who
are featured on the Wall Street Journal’s “Investment Dartboard.” Junttila, Kallunki,
Karja, and Martikainen (2005) report that technology firms’ nonfinancial information
as measured by analysts’ perceptions of value as measured by their opinions in the Most
Admired Companies survey in Fortune magazine is valuable. Also see Piotroski and
Roulstone (2004), Park and Stice (2000), De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Abarbanell
(1991), Lys and Sohn (1990), Givoly and Lakonishok (1979).

2

Guedj and Bouchaud (2005) also find that analysts are on average overly optimistic and
show a pronounced herding behavior for US, EU, UK and JP stocks during the period
1987-2004. The herding effect is more pronounced in US than EU stocks.

3

On average, the level of analyst coverage for break up firms increases by 45 percent
in the three fiscal years following a break up. The increase in coverage by industry
specialists occurs for newly created focused subsidiary firms, but not for parent firms.

4

Gilson et al. (2001) measure industry specialization with a dichotomous variable equal
to one if the analyst covered at least five other firms in the same two-digit SIC industry.
Jacob et al. (1999) measure industry specialization as the percentage of companies
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followed by an analyst with the same two-digit SIC code. None of the studies’ measures,
however, take into account the possibility that large corporations invest in multiple
industries because they only allow each firm to have one SIC code.
5

Articles in the judgment and decision making research found that coarse measures of
experience (i.e., number of years worked) do not reflect the task-specific knowledge
(Anderson & Goldsmith, 1994). Several studies in the accounting literature are
consistent with their findings with respect to forecast accuracy (see Clement et al., 1993;
Hong et al., 1998; Jacob et al., 1999; Jacob & Lys, 2000). Clement (1999) reports
mixed results for different years.
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